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ABSTRACT
Given its systemic importance, a sharp and sustained economic slowdown in China affects the 
world economy, not only on account of its share of global GDP, but also because of its links with 
other economies through trade, the commodities markets and, on a more incipient level, the 
global financial system. Developments in China also have indirect effects on global uncertainty 
and confidence. This article presents various simulations of the negative impact that a sharper 
slowdown in the Chinese economy than expected by the main analysts would have on the global 
economy and, especially, on the euro area. Specifically, a further slowdown in annual growth of 
1 pp in China would give rise to a decline in global growth of 0.4 pp in a year, with particularly 
marked effects on commodities producers and on the Asian economies.
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Introduction
In the first decade of the century, growth in China – over 10% in average annual 
terms – was underpinned by an investment and external sector based model. The 
signs of exhaustion of this model, which in recent years was increasingly dependent 
on credit and economic policy stimulus measures, prompted the authorities to 
introduce an economic rebalancing process, seeking to favour private consumption 
over investment, internal over external demand and services over industry, and 
sacrificing some short-term growth in order to achieve more sustainable growth in 
the long term. To manage this transformation, a structural reform programme is 
needed to boost the role of the private sector in economic decision-making,1 given 
the framework in which the Chinese economy and its institutions operate, in which 
numerous centralised planning aspects still prevail. 
The policies put in place and the resultant economic dynamic have given rise to a 
certain degree of economic rebalancing in China and this, together with the 
adverse external environment, has resulted in a significant slowdown in activity. 
Thus, GDP growth has gradually declined, from close on 10% in 2010 to 6.6% in 
2018. The deceleration was more pronounced in the last two years owing to the 
introduction of credit constraints, targeting shadow banking2 in particular, with 
the ultimate aim of reducing the high level of corporate and local government 
debt.3 Since 2018, the US-China trade disputes have been an additional source of 
weakening for the economy, which grew by 6% in 2019  Q3.4 In the face of a 
sharper than expected deterioration in activity, the Chinese authorities have 
responded with expansionary policies, but the room for manoeuvre is shrinking 
(IMF, 2019a). 
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1  Decisions in numerous areas, including in particular tax, social insurance (health and pensions), management 
of state-owned enterprises, financial development, control of indebtedness, technological innovation and 
environmental protection (Dorrucci et al. (2013) and Mano and Zhang (2018)).
2  Institutions, infrastructure and practices subject to limited regulatory and supervisory oversight. 
3  A result, in turn, of the stimulus policy measures taken post-crisis, focused on investment and financed 
via credit.
4  See Banco de España (2019a).
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Given the importance of China for the global economy, an abrupt slowdown in its 
growth could have significant global repercussions. This article examines the 
effects that a further and permanent weakening of Chinese economic growth 
could have on the rest of the world.5 The analysis includes various channels: 
direct channels, mainly through international trade and demand for commodities; 
and indirect channels, essentially relating to heightened uncertainty and the 
deterioration in global confidence and their effects on international financial 
markets.
The importance of China for the global economy
China’s share of and interconnectedness with the global economy have both grown 
at a considerable pace in recent decades and, therefore, Chinese economic 
development has increasingly significant global repercussions. In terms of purchasing 
power parity, the Chinese economy has achieved a share of almost one-fifth of 
global GDP, compared with 8% in 2001, and since 2014 has had a larger share than 
the United States. In addition, its contribution to global GDP growth has exceeded 
1 pp, in annual average terms, since 2001 (see Chart 1.1), a period in which global 
GDP has grown by 3.8% in annual average terms. 
As a result of its rapid economic growth and its trade liberalisation strategy, China 
has become one of the main players in world trade. Since it joined the World Trade 
Organization in 2001, its share of global imports has risen from 3% to 10% in 2018 
(see Chart 1.2), and the global value added that depends on Chinese final demand 
has also increased. This is particularly significant for many Asian economies and for 
commodities exporters (see Chart  1.3). China also plays a key role in global 
production chains, where it has progressed from assembly work to the contribution 
of higher value-added inputs. This has also given rise to growing spillovers in global 
production (Kee and Tang, 2016). 
At the same time China has become a major commodities consumer, with fluctuations 
in the Chinese economy thus becoming a key determinant in commodities prices. 
China is the leading global customer for and importer of many commodities: it 
consumes around 50% of global copper, aluminium and steel production and 14% 
of oil production. It is also a key producer of many of these products (around 50% of 
aluminium and 40% of copper and iron), although in general domestic production is 
insufficient to meet its demand (see Chart 1.4).
5  The long-term effects are not analysed, owing to the uncertainty as to the implications of the structural 
changes in the Chinese economy and the associated changes in the global economy, and the difficulty of 
incorporating them into the modelling tools used here.
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China’s economic activity has increasingly pronounced global repercussions, on account of its size and contribution to global GDP growth 
and its growing interconnectedness with the rest of the world.
THE GLOBAL ROLE OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY
Chart 1
SOURCES: World Bank, BP Energy Outlook, IMF WEO (October 2019), International Financial Statistics, UN, OECD TiVA database, The 
Wall Street Journal and World Gold Council.
a PPA: purchasing power parity.
b Data at 2015 (latest data available). The chart shows the weight of exports of goods and services to China for the ten largest exporters 
to China. The value added bar denotes the value added for each country that is absorbed by Chinese final demand.
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The Chinese economy is, however, less financially integrated than its size warrants, 
given the restrictions on its capital account. Including the Hong Kong financial 
centre, China accounted for some 7% of global asset and liability positions (gross) 
in 2017, well short of its share of global trade and global GDP. In addition, its 
international investment position structure, based essentially on long-term assets 
and liabilities and international reserves, helps contain potential financial spillovers 
(see Chart 1.5). Looking ahead, the authorities are advocating greater liberalisation 
of the capital account, which will result in greater financial integration (IMF, 2019a). 
Transmission channels and calibration of simulations
The effect of a hypothetical adverse macroeconomic shock in China would be 
transmitted to the rest of the world through several direct and indirect channels. As 
may be inferred from the previous section, the main direct channels would be 
international trade and demand for commodities. A third direct channel – financial 
exposures – is still less significant owing to the restrictions on the capital account in 
China. The indirect channels, which include a possible increase in uncertainty and 
potential deterioration in global confidence, would affect agents’ consumption and 
investment spending decisions (Gil et al., 2017) and could give rise to an episode of 
risk aversion in the international financial markets, causing stock markets to fall and 
risk premiums to rise.6 
To assess the impact of a potential further slowdown in the Chinese economy on 
the rest of the world, a simulation has been performed using the NiGEM global 
econometric model.7 The scenario considered includes a series of permanent 
adverse shocks, associated with a 1 pp drop in the growth rate of China, which are 
transmitted through the channels described above, with a simultaneous impact on 
the global economy.8
The trade spillovers stemming from the permanent drop in Chinese growth are 
reflected in the trade channel. The shock considered entails a fall of 1 pp in China’s 
potential growth and a fall of the same magnitude in its domestic demand, 80% of 
which is attributable to investment.9 This sharper decline in the contribution of 
6  The events of summer 2015 to spring 2016 illustrated China’s potential to affect the international financial 
markets: sharp falls in domestic stock markets, together with changes in the exchange rate regime and 
capital outflows, prompted an increase in global risk aversion.
7  A National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) model.
8  The simulation includes various assumptions: specifically, that expectations are adaptive, that nominal exchange 
rates remain constant, that monetary policy in most countries follows a Taylor rule and that budgetary policy acts 
as an automatic stabiliser (simultaneously maintaining a medium-term budgetary target).
9  This shock has been calibrated drawing on Asian Development Bank (2016).
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investment growth than in the contribution of private consumption, which is 
significant owing to their different import intensity, permits inclusion of the ongoing 
economic rebalancing policies. Moreover, so as to avoid a mechanical response 
from the monetary and fiscal policies in the model, the technical assumption of no 
change in the output gap is introduced, so final demand falls in the same proportion 
as potential growth.
The impact through the commodities channel is particularly significant. Chinese 
demand for commodities has become a key determinant of commodities prices and, 
therefore, of producer countries’ revenue. Slower growth in China would drive down 
not only oil and industrial metal prices,10 but also final demand in commodity-
producing countries. These effects are captured very sparsely by the NiGEM model, 
which is why it must be expanded in several dimensions. First, drawing on the work 
of Ghoshray and Pundit (2016), their estimate as to how commodities prices would 
respond to a fall in Chinese industrial production is used to calculate that a permanent 
decline of 1 pp in growth would be associated with a fall of almost 7% in oil prices 
and of approximately 8% in industrial metal prices11 one year on. Second, the 
estimates available in the economic literature on the elasticity of supply of different 
commodities are used to calculate the drop in production value associated with the 
fall in prices. For oil, the price elasticity of supply estimated by Caldara et al. (2016) 
and the total oil production value supplied by the World Bank12 are incorporated, to 
determine the initial reduction in GDP in each producer country. Similarly, for 
industrial metal production, Stuermer (2017) provides the price elasticities of supply 
for aluminium, copper, lead, tin and zinc, and the International Council of Mining and 
Metals (ICMM) the production value of industrial metals. 
The deterioration in confidence and the increase in uncertainty arising from the 
adverse shock in the Chinese economy are included in the model through the 
financial channel. This shock has various effects on the financial markets, similar 
to those registered between summer 2015 and early 2016, the previous slowdown 
episode in China. These effects are a stock market correction of 10% in the 
Chinese, European, Japanese and US markets,13 and an increase of 50 bp in the 
equity risk premium14 and of 60 bp in long-term interest rates in emerging market 
economies.15
10  Calibrated drawing on Ghoshray and Pundit (2016).
11  Using the Bloomberg Commodity Index weightings on changes in individual prices.
12  For the producer countries considered in the NiGEM: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Indonesia, India, 
Mexico, Russia and Vietnam.
13  In the July 2015 to February 2016 episode, the Chinese, European and Japanese stock markets fell by 
around 20% and the UK and US stock markets by almost 10%.
14  As proposed by Metelli and Natoli (2017).
15  Equivalent to the increase recorded by the Emerging Markets Bonds Index (EMBI) during the market 
turbulence in early 2016.
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The global impact of a sharper slowdown in China
The scenario that includes all the shocks described in the previous section would 
give rise to a reduction in global growth of 0.4 pp one year on (see Chart 2.1). In 
advanced economies, the overall impact on GDP would be less than -0.3 pp, as the 
contractionary effect of the trade and financial shocks would be limited by the 
opposite effect of the fall in commodities prices, as advanced economies are 
particularly reliant on commodities. Conversely, the contraction in activity would be 
most pronounced in emerging market economies (-0.5  pp), and in particular in 
A further economic slowdown in China would give rise to a significant decline in global growth. While in advanced economies the expansionary 
impact of lower commodities prices would limit the effect of the other shocks, among emerging market economies the contraction in activity 
would be most pronounced in commodity-producing countries and the Asian economies.
IMPACT OF A HYPOTHETICAL ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN IN CHINA
Chart 2
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
NOTE: Simulations made using the NiGEM macroeconometric model. First impact of shocks in Q1 of Year 1. Trade channel: 1 pp decline in 
potential and rebalancing of final demand; commodity price channel: drop of 6.9% in the price of oil and of 7.8 % in the price of metals; and 
financial channel: 10% stock market fall, increase of 50 bp in equity risk premium and of 60 bp in long-term interest rates in emerging market 
economies.
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commodity-producing countries and in certain Asian economies with strong 
interconnections with China (see Chart  2.1). This scenario would also generate 
disinflationary pressures that would be most pronounced in emerging market 
economies, and especially commodity-producing ones (see Chart 2.2).
By geographical area, the Latin American and Asian economies would be the most 
affected. Growth rates in Latin America16 would be reduced by between 0.7  pp 
(Brazil and Argentina) and 1.4  pp (Chile), primarily through the financial and the 
commodities channels.17 In Asia the impact would vary between -0.3 pp for South 
Korea and -0.8 pp for Indonesia, with all three channels being significant. Among the 
advanced economies, GDP growth in the United States, the euro area, the United 
Kingdom and Japan would decrease by between 0.2 pp and 0.3 pp, owing above all 
to the effects transmitted through the financial markets, while the contractionary 
effect of the trade channel and the expansionary effect of lower commodities prices 
would offset each other.18
There are certain factors not included in the simulation that could mitigate the global 
effects. The exercise performed considers neither a possible expansionary policy 
response in China nor a possible depreciation of the renminbi associated with slower 
long-term growth. Moreover, in advanced economies, if certain assets (such as 
government debt) were to become safe haven assets, this would tend to limit the 
scale of the effects produced through the financial channel. Also, the simulation may 
possibly not be taking sufficiently into account the transformation of China’s 
production, trade and financial structures stemming from its convergence process 
and which has been reinforced by the economic rebalancing policies of recent years. 
For example, the changes in the economic structure towards a greater consumption 
share, to the detriment of investment, and the lower import content of China’s exports 
as a result of its economic development are reducing its import intensity and, 
therefore, its spillover capacity. 
Lastly, US protectionist policies could alter the role that China currently plays in 
global trade, with an impact on third countries. Higher US-China tariffs may give rise 
to changes in the location of global manufacturing chains in which China plays a 
prominent part, with consequences that could be either positive or negative for 
activity in third countries, according to the extent to which it can complement or 
replace China’s own production. As regards trade diversion effects, which also 
depend on the degree of import substitution, to date the evidence is scant, limited 
16  For more details of the effects of China in Latin America, see Timini and El-Dahrawy Sánchez-Albornoz 
(2019).
17  The commodities channel is especially significant in Chile, since metals production makes up some 14% 
of its GDP.
18  These effects are higher than those obtained by the ECB, where commodity channel effects predominate 
and the financial channel is absent (see Dieppe et al., 2018).
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to a certain relative improvement in trade in other emerging Asian economies19 and 
in certain commodity-producing countries,20 with no significant impact apparent in 
the euro area. In this respect even a possible US-China trade deal, which would help 
reduce global uncertainty, could have a cost in terms of trade diversion if the two 
economies were to grant each other mutual preferential treatment. Indeed, the IMF 
(2019b) signals significant trade diversion effects in the medium term that will affect 
Korean and Japanese exports, and to a lesser extent EU exports, and that will also 
prompt changes in sectoral location. One last effect that has not been taken into 
account in this article is that associated with the US restrictions on technology 
exchange. This factor would have a potential impact on productivity in the medium 
and long term, as a result of the sector’s large-scale global integration and of the 
growing role of China, as a generator of value added and as a final customer (see 
Chart 1.6).
3.12.2019.
19  See Asian Development Bank, 2019.
20  See Banco de España (2019b).
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